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DEFENDING THE "INDEFENSIBLE": REPLACING
ETHNOCENTRISM WITH A NATIVE AMERICAN CULTURAL
DEFENSE
Megan H. Dearth*

I. Introduction
Throughout history, federal Indian policy has vacillated between separation
and assimilation. Sometimes federal and state governments recognize and
promote tribal sovereignty, while other times, the policy favors assimilation
into the dominant culture over individualism.' Currently, the policy is one of
self-determination, geared toward restoring inherent rights, including that of
tribal self-government, back to the tribes.2 Nevertheless, statutes fashioned in
favor of assimilation are still very much in operation and come into conflict
with efforts to encourage tribes to preserve and maintain their culture. The
most egregious offenders are the statutes designed to afford criminal and civil
jurisdiction to federal and state courts - the Major Crimes Act and Public Law
280.4 These acts give federal courts and some state courts jurisdiction over
crimes and other offenses committed by Native Americans in Indian Country,'
leaving tribal members vulnerable to injustice when charged and tried by
arbiters unfamiliar with their individual laws and customs.'

* Second-year student, University of Oklahoma College of Law.
1. See Jace Weaver, The Pendulum Swings of Indian Policy, EJOURNAL USA, Spring
2009, at 16, 16-18, http://www.arnerica.gov/media/pdf/ejs/0609.pdf(tracing the shifting federal
policy toward Indians). See generallyJudith V. Royster, The Legacy ofAllotment, 27 ARIz. ST.
L.J. 1 (1995); Kevin K. Washburn, Tribal Self-Determinationat the Crossroads,38 CONN. L.
REV. 777 (2006) [hereinafter Washburn, Crossroads];Blake A. Watson, The Thrust and Parry
ofFederalIndian Law, 23 U. DAYTON L. REV. 437 (1998).
2. Weaver, supra note 1; see also Washburn, Crossroads,supra note 1, at 777.
3. 18 U.S.C. § 1153 (2006).
4. 28 U.S.C. § 1360 (2006).
5. 18 U.S.C. § 1153 (granting federal jurisdiction over Native Americans who commit
felonies in Indian Country); 28 U.S.C. § 1360 (granting certain states criminal and civil
adjudicatory jurisdiction over disputes that arise in Indian Country).
6. For academic discussion of these acts and their effects, see Kevin K. Washburn,
American Indians, Crime, and the Law, 104 MICH. L. REv. 709 (2006); Vanessa J. Jim6nez &
Soo C. Song, Concurrent Tribaland State Jurisdiction Under Public Law 280, 47 AM. U. L.
REV. 1627 (1998); Carole Goldberg & Duane Champagne, Is Public Law 280 Fitfor the
Twenty-First Century? Some Data at Last, 38 CONN. L. REV. 697 (2006).
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State and federal courts currently have no protective process to account for
the potential prejudice a Native American defendant may experience when
haled into "foreign" courts. That there are no safeguards is curious given that
current federal policy is geared toward tribal sovereignty and the preservation
of Native American culture.' With this policy in mind, courts need protective
mechanisms in place to eliminate ethnocentric prejudice both at trial and
sentencing. First, prejudice may arise when a Native American's case is heard
before a tribunal comprised of ajudge or jury of the dominant Western society,
prone to evaluate the tribal defendant's actions against a hypothetical
reasonable-Western-defendant standard. When what is reasonable in Western
American society differs from what is reasonable in Native American society,
a tribal defendant may not receive a fair trial unless the decision-maker is
educated with respect to cultural differences potentially impacting his
behavior. Second, prejudice may surface in the criminal sentencing phase if
there are no procedures that take into account precisely how cultural
characteristics influence action or whether tribal punishment theory would be
more appropriate to the circumstances.
One mechanism through which such protection could occur is the
recognition of a formal Native American cultural defense. The cultural
defense is "defined as 'a defense asserted by immigrants, refugees, and
indigenous people based on their customs or customary law.'"" The
underlying premise is that there should be "tolerance of foreign cultures due
to a lack of moral basis for punishment."' A formal cultural defense for Native
Americans creates an avenue for the introduction of evidence when necessary
to protect the "distinct status of Indians in America.""o Although there is no
formally recognized cultural defense, some courts have allowed into evidence
cultural characteristics of a defendant that may impact a moral basis for
punishment."

7. But see Michael P. Gross, Indian Self-Determination and Tribal Sovereignty: An
Analysis ofRecent FederalIndian Policy, 56 TEx. L. REv. 1195 (1978) (outlining the ways in
which modem policy falls short of true self-determination and sovereignty).
8. Andrew M. Kanter, Note, The Yenaldlooshi in Court and the Killing of a Witch: The
Casefor an Indian CulturalDefense, 4 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 411, 413 (1995).
9. Id.
10. Id. at 414.
11. See id. at 413-14; Tamar Tomer-Fishman, "CulturalDefense," "CulturalOffense, " or
No Culture atAll?: An EmpiricalExaminationoflsraeliJudicialDecisionsin CulturalConflict
CriminalCases and of the FactorsAffecting Them, 100 J.CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 475, 482
(2010) (listing three high-profile cases where a cultural defense was examined: People v.
Kimura, People v. Moua, and People v. Chen).
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Literature on the cultural defense primarily discusses immigrants rather than
Native Americans,12 but the rationales reflect the same concerns. In fact,
implementing a formal cultural defense for Native Americans is even more
compelling than implementing a similar defense for immigrants. Those who
live in Indian Country and abide by a separate set of laws and moral guidelines
are especially prejudiced when haled into "foreign" courts - even more so than
immigrants - because they do not avail themselves intentionally to the laws or
customs of the dominant Western society.
This comment advocates for a formal Native American cultural defense. It
asserts that such a defense promotes the legitimacy of tribal punishment
theory, honors the unique relationship between the tribes and the federal
government, and, most importantly, alleviates some of the prejudices resulting
from Native American defendants being haled into "foreign" courts. Part II
first outlines the traditional cultural defense and demonstrates how it aligns
with the punishment theories of criminal law. It then examines various
criticisms imposed upon the cultural defense, and thereafter provides counterarguments thereof. Part III reviews the Crow Dog decision and reveals how
the Major Crimes Act, Public Law 280, and the current Federal Sentencing
Guidelines collectively create the need for a cultural defense for affected
Native American defendants. Part IV demonstrates how the adoption of a
cultural defense for tribal members tried in Public Law 280 state courts and in
federal courts largely can alleviate the problems that attend these acts. It
illustrates how a society's cultural mores and laws create a "reasonable
person" standard, universally applicable to all defendants, regardless of
individual characteristics or considerations. It then advocates three steps to
implement the proposed Native American cultural defense. First, the Rules of
Evidence should be amended to create a presumption of relevance for the
admission of Native American cultural evidence. Second, the courts should
view the illegal acts through the lens of a "reasonable Native American
person" standard, rather than the traditional "reasonable person" standard that
presupposes a Western American person. Last, the Federal Sentencing
Guidelines similarly should be amended to promote the admission of Native
American cultural evidence, such as prior tribal punishment or tribal
punishment theory, to provide a downward departure from the sentence
allotted for particular crimes.

12. Kanter, supra note 8, at 413.
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I. Scope of the TraditionalCulturalDefense
The cultural defense is what a defendant uses to show evidence of his
cultural background and its relevance to his culpability." Currently, a formal
cultural defense is not legislatively authorized and "the case law dealing with
cultural defenses is not yet well established."l 4 Nonetheless, some courts
allow cultural evidence to enter the courtroom to explain the case from the
individual's cultural perspective." At the same time, many judges are hesitant
to allow a cultural defense in fear that it will be reversed on appeal or that it
is "irrelevant." 6
A. The CulturalDefense in the Courtroom
In a criminal case, a defendant may use a cultural argument during the guilt
phase of sentencing "to negate a required element of a crime, to secure an
acquittal, or to support an established defense such as insanity or
provocation." 7 Defendants might also seek to use culture to justify a
downward departure from the Federal Sentencing Guidelines during the
sentencing phase.'" Finally, cultural evidence may be used pre-trial to
influence the prosecution's decision to "arrest, prosecute, or negotiate a
plea."' 9
In a civil case, the cultural defense can be used when, for example, family
courts are determining the status of parents as "fit" or "unfit," as well as
whether a prenuptial agreement should be enforced when its terms otherwise
would be unenforceable.20 A person may also seek to exempt himself from a
certain policy, such as government-mandated vaccination, for religious* or

13. ALisoN DUNDES RENTELN, THE CULTURAL DEFENSE 6 (2004). For general academic
discussion ofthe cultural defense, see DUNDES, supra;Elaine M. Chiu, Cultureas Justification,
Not Excuse, 43 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1317 (2006); Cynthia Lee, CulturalConvergence: Interest
Convergence Theory Meets the Cultural Defense, 49 ARIZ. L. REV. 911 (2007); James M.
Donovan & John Stuart Garth, Delimitingthe CulturalDefense, 26 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 109
(2007).
14. Alison Dundes Renteln, Raising CulturalDefenses, in CULTURAL ISSUES INCRIMINAL
DEFENSE 772 (Linda Friedman Ramirez ed., 3d ed. 2010).
15. Id.
16. Id. at 771-72; RENTELN, supra note 13, at 23.
17. RENTELN, supra note 13, at 7.
18. See id.; United States v. Guzman, 236 F.3d 830, 831-32 (7th Cir. 2001) (seeking to
depart from the Federal Sentencing Guidelines due to factors relating to her Mexican cultural
heritage).
19. RENTELN, supra note 13, at 7.
20. See id.
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cultural reasons. 2' Likewise, a plaintiff seeking money damages may use a
cultural defense if a cultural condition makes the event more traumatic than
what is "reasonable" to a person in the dominant Western society. 22
When a party raises a cultural issue, the issues that generally arise on appeal
relate to whether the trial court abused its discretion by (1) admitting or failing
to admit such evidence because it is deemed relevant or irrelevant, (2) finding
the evidence relevant, but failing to provide an adequate jury instruction as to
the weight of the evidence, and (3) considering or failing to consider such
evidence during the sentencing phase.23 An established cultural defense
restricts the discretion allowed by lower courts with regard to cultural
evidence, and will reverse the common practice of barring such evidence.24
A common use of the cultural defense is in Asian American cases involving
oyako-shinju, which is parent-child suicide. When intending to commit
suicide, mothers murder their children under the view that "it is more cruel to
leave the children behind with no one to look after them than it is for the
mother to take them with her to the afterlife."25 In People v Kimura, a
Japanese American, "learn[ing] of the infidelity of her husband, [] attempted
oyako-shinju . .. by wading into the Pacific Ocean with her two children."26
Though her children died, "she survived and was charged with first-degree
murder." 27 Kimura "had resided in the United States for several years," but
"had not become assimilated" into the dominant culture because she "remained
culturally isolated" within the bounds of her Japanese American society.28
"[H]er homicide charge [later] was reduced to voluntary manslaughter" 29 after
the Japanese American community gathered a 25,000-signature petition,
begging "the Los Angeles County district attorney not to prosecute" because
"her actions were based on a different worldview."o Although considered
21. See id.
22. See id.
23. Id.
24. See id. at 6.
25. Renteln, supra note 14, at 774.
26. RENTELN, supra note 13, at 25 (citing People v. Kimura, No. A-091133 (Los Angeles
Super. Ct. Nov. 21, 1985) (unpublished opinion)).
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Id. (noting that her punishment was "one year in countyjail,... five years probation,
and psychiatric counseling").
30. Id. But see Renteln, supra note 14, at 774-75 ("Six psychiatrists testified that Kimura
was suffering from temporary insanity. Some based their conclusion on her failure to
distinguish between her own life and the lives of her children... . [H]er attorney claimed that
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illegal in Japan, oyako-shinju "is not unheard of as a means by which a family
can avoid an otherwise unacceptable social predicament."'
Another case involved a recent immigrant to the United States who suffered
from depression and intended to commit suicide.32 Prior to the attempted
suicide, her seven-year-old son told her that he did not feel loved by his
father. She thereafter killed her son before attempting to kill herself, and was
charged with first-degree murder.34 Without objection from the prosecution,
the defense admitted cultural evidence via expert witnesses testifying that the
defendant's Chinese culture influenced her decisions. In Chinese culture, her
son's perception that he was "unwanted," coupled with the fear that he would
be alone after her death, left her no option but to kill her son before killing
herself, so that they could depart to heaven and she could focus on caring for
him in the afterlife." The defense also sought to submit an instruction to the
jury to use this cultural evidence to decide the mental element of the crime or
"any other issue in the case." 3 7 The prosecution objected to the instruction,
and the court sided with the prosecution for fear that such an "instruction
would tell[] [the jury] that is the law."" The court of appeals, however,
reversed the trial court's decision and found that the instruction applied to the
evidence and defense of the case." The court of appeals stated that, on
remand, "the defendant is entitled to have the jury instructed that it may
consider evidence of defendant's cultural background in determining the
existence or nonexistence of the relevant mental states."40

the favorable plea bargain relied on the psychiatric testimony [but] commentators believe that
cultural factors played a role in the process."); RENTELN, supra note 13, at 228 n.5 ("[Tihe
Defense Sentencing Report contains statements suggesting that Kimura suffered a cognitive
impairment: Her severe mental and emotional illness prevented her from thinking or acting
rationally. ... Because of her mental condition and her cultural background, Defendant did not
perceive her parent-child suicide as an illegal act.") (alteration in original) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
31. RENTELN, supra note 13, at 25.
32. People v. Wu, 286 Cal. Rptr. 868 (1991).
33. Id. at 872.
34. Id. at 872-73.
35. Id. at 883.
36. Id. at 885.
37. Id. at 882-83.
38. Id. at 880 (alteration in original).
39. Id at 887.
40. Id. For a more comprehensive discussion of the cultural defense in cases involving
Asian women, see Leti Volpp, (Mis)Identifying Culture: Asian Women and the "Cultural
Defense", 17 HARv. WOMEN'S L.J. 57 (1994).
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B. Critiques of the CultureDefense
Critiques of the culture defense are usually based upon two grounds: "that
newly arrived immigrants should be assimilated as rapidly as possible and that
individualized justice leads to anarchic trends and increases in crime.' At the
forefront of these objections is the "when in Rome, do as the Romans do"
argument, derived from the assimilative principle that "everyone should be
held to the same, single standard."'4 2 They argue that if a member of a cultural
minority is, in some circumstances, held to a different standard, she essentially
receives preferential treatment over those of the cultural majority, resulting in
a violation of equal protection because it results in "[un]identical treatment
under the law.1 3 Furthermore, critics assert that this "special treatment" could
weaken the justice system in general because it is "too confusing to have
separate legal codes for different groups within the same national political
system."" They maintain that this lack of uniformity could lead to anarchy
because "individuals and groups could decide on their own with which laws
they would comply [and] there would no longer be any certainty or
predictability in the legal system."'

Another common worry about the implementation of a formal culture
defense is that it undermines one of the overall purposes of criminal
punishment - deterrence.46 Deterrence, which "is sometimes referred to as the
crime control model," centers on the "core idea [] that the law must sanction
deviant acts to uphold the social order." 4 7 Punishment under this model is
intended to deter "the defendant himself from committing another crime" or
"to deter others in society from committing crimes."" Critics of the cultural
defense are concerned that it "reduces culpability, . . . undermines the
deterrence function of the criminal justice system, . . . [and that] [i]f a person
is not punished for a culturally motivated act, . . . [it] may perpetuate the

tradition with impunity.'

41. Kanter, supra note 8, at 424 (citation omitted).
42. RENTELN, supra note 13, at 193.

43. Id.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.

Id. at 192.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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Another fear is characterized as the "boomerang effect." This is a fear that
"gender norms of minority cultures" will influence the majority culture as
well.so This might result from cases accommodating the "sexist practices" of
cultural minorities, which "may well feed back into the majority culture."
Criminal defendants in the majority culture might argue the precedent set from
these cultural minority cases, asserting that they too should have access to the
defenses, which in turn could effectively "reshape" mainstream law."
For instance, judges have already created an avenue for culture to be used
in future domestic abuse cases.53 In one case, a Japanese American sought to
use the defense after he murdered "an African American woman with whom
he had a relationship." 4 He argued on appeal that, because his state of mind
was linked with his cultural background, "the jury should have been instructed
'to evaluate the sufficiency of provocation from the standpoint of a reasonable
person in terms of the defendant's position as a Japanese American."'" This
type of "proposed jury instruction reflects the idea, increasingly made by
minority defendants, that equal access to mainstream legal defenses requires
consideration of cultural factors." 6 This may raise equal protection concerns
because victims of "culturally motivated crimes" may "receive less protection
than victims whose perpetrators happen to be from the mainstream
community.", 7
Even if these types of cases are not used "as precedents in cases involving
defendants of the dominant culture," critics of the cultural defense argue that
the "boomerang effect[] can occur across minority groups." For instance,
"[a] federal appellate court held that cultural evidence may be admitted where

50. SARAH SONG, JUSTICE, GENDER, AND THE POLITICS OF MULTICULTURALISM 109 (2007).
51.

Id.

52. Id. ("In seeking a jury instruction of provocation, a mainstream defendant could point
to such cases and argue that if immigrants can have access to the provocation defense, then he
should, too.").
53. Seeid.atllO-ll.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 111 (quoting People v. Kobayashi, No. B157685,2003 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS
2929, at *9-11, *32 (2d Dist. Mar. 26, 2003)). Despite that the appellate court "sidestepp[ed]
the question of whether there is an equal protection and due process right to a culturally specific
evaluation of the element of provocation," the case is "troubling since judges exercise
considerable discretion on whether and how cultural evidence gets considered." Id. at 110-11.
56. Id. at I10.
57. RENTELN, supra note 13, at 193. Likewise, there are equal protection concerns where
culturally motivated perpetrators are held to a different standard and receive mitigated
punishment, while those without a cultural defense do not. Id.
58. SONG, supra note 50, at 111.
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it is relevant to the defendant's culpability," and subsequently admitted
religious evidence relevant to the defendant's culpability as "a co-conspirator
in the murder of his sister's ex-husband."5 9 This holding was later cited by
another court.6 o That later court allowed a woman who brought a rape charge
against her husband to use "cultural evidence to explain why she had been
willing to agree to an arranged marriage and to stay with him despite a history
of physical and sexual abuse."6 ' Both cases "permitted juries to consider
patriarchal traditions to explain and partially excuse people's behavior." 62 The
fear is that members of the minority culture will learn that their behavior may
go unpunished, engendering a negative deterrent effect - or perhaps even
effective encouragement.63
In particular, Santa ClaraPueblo v. Martinez' has been cited as a decision
that maintained a tribal patriarchal tradition, resulting in constitutional
violations of tribal members.6 1 In this case, a woman challenged the genderdiscriminatory membership process of the Santa Clara Pueblo tribe, which
denied "membership in the tribe to children of female members who marry
outside the tribe, while extending membership to children of male members
who marry outside the tribe."6 The Court deferred to the interest of tribal
sovereignty and held in favor of the tribe, reasoning that to find for the mother
in this case may, in effect, "substantially interfere with a tribe's ability to
maintain itself as a culturally and politically distinct entity."6 Critics of the
cultural defense contend that if there are no limits to tribal sovereignty to
protect the rights of individual tribal members, tribal authorities may embrace

59. Id. (citing Bains v. Cambra, 204 F.3d 964, 970 (9th Cir. 2000)).
60. Id.
61. Id. (citing People v. Hundal,No. F037541,2002 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 8619, at *6
(Cal. App. 5 Dist. Sept. 6, 2002)).
62. Id. at 112.
63. RENTELN, supra note 13, at 192-93.
64. 436 U.S. 49 (1978). For academic discussion of Santa ClaraPueblo v. Martinez and
its subsequent jurisprudence, see Gloria Valencia-Weber, Old andNew StrainsandAmerican
Indians, 80 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 333 (2004); Gloria Valencia-Weber, Santa Clara Pueblo v.
Martinez: Twenty-Five Years of DisparateCultural Visions, 14 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 49
(2004); Shefali Milczarek-Desai, (Re)Locating Other/Third World Women: An Alternative
Approach to Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez's Construction of Gender, Cultureand Identity,
13 UCLA WOMEN'S L.J. 235 (2005); Robert Laurence, A QuincentennialEssay on Martinez
v. Santa Clara Pueblo, 28 IDAHO L. REv. 307 (1991-1992).
65. See SONG, supra note 50, at 115-20.
66. Martinez, 436 U.S. at 51.
67. Id. at 71-72.
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gender-biased rules as an expression of tribal sovereignty, effectively usurping
individual constitutional rights afforded to individual Indians through the
Indian Civil Rights Act (ICRA). 6 1
Other criticisms include the fear that the cultural defense "reinforces false,
anachronistic stereotypes" because culturally motivated decisions "fossiliz[e]
cultures as a reductive stereotype, and lead to inquiries into whether a
defendant's identity sufficiently matches that stereotype to merit expert
testimony." 69 These critics further argue that "a formal cultural defense" is
unnecessary because "the legal system can incorporate cultural evidence via
existing defenses.""o Last, critics cite problems with line-drawing as a
justification for rejecting a formal cultural defense."
C. Silencing the Critics of the CulturalDefense
Proponents of the cultural defense assert that consideration of cultural
evidence as a possible defense at all stages of a criminal case is unlikely to
undermine the deterrence purpose of criminal punishment. In many cases,
"[t]he severity of the punishment is inconsequential to deterrence."72 Any
punishment at all, "no matter how severe or light, would provide notice to the

68. See SONG, supra note 50, at 132; 25 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1303 (2006). For academic
discussion of the Indian Civil Rights Act, see Carole E. Goldberg, IndividualRights and Tribal
Revitalization,35 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 889 (2003); Elmer R. Rusco, CivilLiberties GuaranteesUnder
TribalLaw:A Survey ofCivilRights Provisionsin TribalConstitutions,14 AM. INDIAN L. REV.
269 (1990); Robert Laurence, Martinez, Oliphant and FederalCourtReview of TribalActivity
Under the Indian Civil Rights Act, 10 CAMPBELL L. REv. 411 (1988); Robert Laurence, The
Enforcement of Judgments Across Indian Reservation Boundaries: Full Faith and Credit,
Comity, and the Indian Civil Rights Act, 69 OR. L. REv. 589 (1990); Robert Laurence, Federal
CourtReview of TribalActivity Underthe Indian Civil Rights Act, 68 N.D. L. REv. 657 (1992);
Mark D. Rosen, Multiple AuthoritativeInterpretersof Quasi-ConstitutionalFederalLaw: Of
Tribal Courts and the Indian Civil Rights Act, 69 FORDHAM L. REv. 479 (2000); Robert J.
McCarthy, Civil Rights in Tribal Courts: The Indian Bill ofRights at Thirty Years, 34 IDAHO
L. REv. 465 (1998).
69. RENTELN, supra note 13, at 193.
70. Id. at 194.
71. Id. at 193-94 ("Even if one could justify the use of the cultural defense on normative
grounds, many would still object to the defense because of difficulties they anticipate with the
implementation of the policy. A frequently mentioned criticism of the cultural defense is that
it will be impossible to draw the line between legitimate and illegitimate uses of it. This is
partly because some claim it is hard to prove the existence of specific customs. They also
question whether second- and third-generation offspring of immigrant parents are sufficiently
influenced by traditions to justify their use of the cultural defense.").
72. Id. at 195.
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ethnic minority community that the conduct is not permissible." Therefore,
in the event that a cultural defense is used and merely results in a reduced
sentence, it would provide no effective incentive for members of the group to
repeat those acts in the future.74
Not only does empirical data question the deterrent effect of punishment,
but "[t]he number of culturally motivated acts is a fraction of the total number
of crimes." 5 Moreover, "fears of . .. increased crime are unfounded" in the
context of a Native American culture defense because "the criminal law has
little deterrent effect on individuals compelled to act by their culture."76
Consequently, where a Native American is punished by a non-tribal court,
there is no guarantee that the message will cross the cultural barrier at the
reservation's edge to notify tribal members that such conduct will not be
tolerated."
But deterrence is not the only purpose of criminal punishment. If it were
"the sole objective of punishment," it would "make no difference who is
punished - guilty or innocent."" That the conduct is not to be tolerated would
be conveyed to society, regardless of the guilt or innocence of the accused."
Apart from deterrence, another justification for criminal punishment is
retribution, which posits that a wrongdoer should be punished as a matter of
public morality - an eye for an eye. 80 The common phrase that "the
punishment should fit the crime" suggests that criminal liability "should not
be disproportionately severe or lenient."" When the cultural defense is used
in Native American cases, retribution is ineffective when a tribal member is
punished for actions considered reasonable or less culpable within the bounds

73. Id.
74. Id. ("[I]f a husband is convicted of manslaughter instead of murder, the general
deterrence function of the law would still exist.").
75. RENTELN, supra note 13, at 194 ("[E]mpirical data does not prove that punishment
deters crime; usually the issue is whether more severe punishment creates a greater deterrent,
but it is the causal relationship that is in question.").
76. Kanter, supranote 8, at 426; see also RENTELN, supra note 13, at 194-95 ("Ifa member
of a particular ethnic group believes strongly in the efficacy of folk medicine or the importance
of traditional marriage practices, it stands to reason that he will try to preserve his way of life
wherever he goes.").
77. See Kanter, supra note 8, at 426.
78. RENTELN, supra note 13, at 194.
79. Id.
80. JoHN KAPLAN ET AL., CIUmINAL LAW CASES AND MATERIALS 21 (6th ed. 2008);
RENTELN, supra note 13, at 188.
81. RENTELN, supra note 13, at 188.
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of her society. Where an individual acts unreasonably in light of the
mainstream "reasonable person" standard, the conduct may nonetheless be
"reasonable" in the eyes of her tribal peers. An individual is not deserving of
the maximum penalty when the parameters of reasonableness set by her
society are different from the majoritarian parameters used to formally judge
her behavior.
Some opponents allege equal protection violations on account of
"preferential treatment" for perpetrators of culturally motivated acts. But this
ignores that the purpose of criminal law is to ensure that defendants receive
just punishment, the determination of which focuses on the defendant's mental
state, or mens rea.82 "Ifthere is any equal protection violation, it occurs when
courts fail to consider cultural evidence, thus rendering them unable to assess
accurately what has transpired in a given case."8 Where this occurs and the
cultural evidence is material to the defendant's mens rea,the courts are unable
to fairly evaluate the defendant's motivations, unlike a defendant of the
mainstream culture, whose motivations should theoretically align with the
uniform "reasonable person" standard. Without uniform guidelines directing
courts to take cultural factors into consideration when trying and convicting
Native Americans for crimes committed in Indian Country, the principles of
criminal punishment are undermined.
Some critics of the cultural defense argue that it is important to assimilate
behavior regardless of cultural barriers. But this view ignores many veritable
realities. First, it is unrealistic to believe that cultural groups will collectively
give up cultural traditions simply because those traditions are condemned by
mainstream society. Second, this assimilative attitude goes against legal
pluralism and modem federal Indian policy. "Pluralism" promotes the idea
that the American justice system respects equality and "the rights of others to
simply be different."84 Without this concept, "cultural values that diverge
from mainstream norms" are quashed, resulting in a "single orthodoxy - a
result repugnant to the American political paragon."85
With regard to Native American tribal practices and beliefs, the promotion
of legal pluralism is momentous on account of the sovereign status of tribal
nations within the United States. Although past federal policies toward
Indians have at times engendered "legal confusion regarding the effects of
cultural practices," the modem era of tribal self-determination promotes

82.
83.
84.
85.

Id. at 196.
Id.
Kanter, supra note 8, at 422-23.
Id. at 423.
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development of tribal governments and recognition of the inherent value of
Indian cultural practices. Despite that the Santa ClaraPueblo Court upheld
a patriarchal rule that infringes on the basic rights of tribal members, the
Supreme Court nonetheless sent a message that federal involvement should be
limited with respect to the political functions of tribes.87 It therefore seems
contradictory that principles of cultural preservation and self-government
remain at the political level, while there are currently no mechanisms to
protect cultural identity in the courts. Consequently, this "sends out a broader
message that Indians must trade their cultural ways in exchange for foreign
criminal codes."8
III. Establishingthe Necessity of a CulturalDefensefor Native Americans
Currently, there is no formal culture defense established in any state or by
the federal government.8 The impact that culture will have on a particular
case is left to the discretion of state and federal judges.90 And when it comes
to the criminal sentencing process, federal law presumes that Native American
tribal punishment theory has no place in determining the appropriate sentence
for tribal peoples." Due to the unique status of tribes as wards of the federal
government under the trust doctrine," protection through an established
cultural defense is necessary both for the federal government to fulfill its

86. Id.
87. See Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49,71 (1978) ("[T]he tribes remain quasisovereign nations which, by government structure, culture, and source of sovereignty, are in
many ways foreign to the constitutional institutions of the federal and state governments.").
88. Kanter, supra note 8, at 424.
89. RENTELN, supra note 13, at 23.
90. Id. Although some courts have entertained cultural arguments, judges often find
cultural evidence "irrelevant." Id.
91. See U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, FEDERAL SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL 454
(2010) [hereinafter FEDERAL SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL], availableat http://www.ussc.
gov/Guidelines/201 0_guidelines/ManualPDF/2010_GuidelinesManualFull.pdf.
92. Katheleen R. Guzman, Give or Take an Acre: Property Norms and the Indian Land
ConsolidationAct, 85 IOWA L. REV. 595, 651 (2000) (noting that the "'trust doctrine' fixes the
tribes as wards dependent on the federal government for sustenance and protection from the
states and themselves"). For more academic discussion of the trust doctrine, see Mary
Christina Wood, Indian Land and the Promise of Native Sovereignty: The Trust Doctrine
Revisited, 1994 UTAH L. REV. 1471; Reid Peyton Chambers, Judicial Enforcement of the
Federal Trust Responsibility to Indians, 27 STAN. L. REV. 1213 (1975); Gavin Clarkson &
David DeKorte, UnguardedIndians: The Complete Failureofthe Post-OliphantGuardianand
the Dual-EdgedNature ofParensPatriae,2010 U. ILL. L. REV. 1119.
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protective obligations and so that tribal cultural differences, which are
encouraged by federal policy, 93 are considered.
Moreover, tribal punishment theory or prior tribal punishment should have
an impact on the sentencing process. Recognition of tribes as domestic
dependent nations is recognition of their inherent sovereignty as independent
political entities.94 Many tribes have their own political systems, made up of
law-making bodies, courts, and police organizations.95 In fact, at the birth of
the self-determination era, President Nixon spoke to Congress about the
importance of "creat[ing] the conditions for a new era in which the Indian
future is determined by Indian acts and Indian decisions."" This includes the
goal of a "new national policy toward the Indian people: to strengthen the
Indian's sense of autonomy without threatening his sense of community."9 7
Nixon charged Congress to "make it clear that Indians can become
independent of Federal control without being cut off from Federal concern and
Federal support."" Congress responded with legislation to further that goal,
which strived to increase the proficiency of tribal courts to resolve disputes
and to punish criminal conduct in ways they deem appropriate.99 in response,

93. See DAvID H. GETCHES ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 221,
224 (5th ed. 2005). For example, the American Religious Freedom Act of 1978, 42 U.S.C. §
1996 (2006), shows "recognition by federal policymakers of the continuing existence and
vitality of Indian religions. It constitutes [] a symbolically important acknowledgment of Indian
religious tenets." GETCHES ET AL., supra, at 221. Moreover, "Congress has taken steps to
protect the cultures of Native Americans" by enacting the Native American Graves Protection
and Repatriation Act, 25 U.S.C. §§ 3001-3013 (2006), to protect "tribal burial sites and rights
to items of cultural significance." GETCHES ET AL., supra, at 224.
94. See Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 519 (1832) ("The Indian nations had
always been considered as distinct, independent political communities, retaining their original
natural rights.").
95. For example, the Navajo Nation currently governs more than 250,000 members.
History,OFFIcIAL SrE OF THE NAVAJO NATION (Jan. 17, 2011, 11:42 AM), http://www.navajo.
org/history.htm. The government is structured in three-branches, consisting of an executive,
judiciary, and legislative branch, comprised of eighty-eight delegates who "represent[] 110
Navajo Nation chapters." Id. While in session, it is likely that delegates will speak Navajo, and
the Navajo Nation prides itself in "retain[ing] its valuable cultural heritage while forging ahead
with modern progress." Id.
96. Message from the President of the United States Transmitting Recommendations for
Indian Policy, H.R. Doc. No. 91-363, 91st Cong. (July 8, 1970), reprintedin GETCHES ET AL.,
supra note 93, at 218-19.
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. See Indian Tribal Justice Act, 25, U.S.C. §§ 3601-3631 (2006) (authorizing increased
federal funding of Indian tribal courts); Indian Civil Rights Act, 25 U.S.C. § 1302 (2006) (1986
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tribal courts "are developing in leaps and bounds," many "expand[ing] the use
of traditional law" in combination with "unique tribal law.""oo
As it stands now, however, tribal law or punishment theory does not have
much of a place in the American criminal courts during the sentencing
process. There is currently an "opt in" provision that operates to bar capital
sentences,or reflecting the legitimate concern for tribes that find capital
punishment contrary to their culture.102 There is no other opportunity,
however, for tribal punishment theory or other cultural factors to play a part
in the sentencing process.
A. How a Native American Gets into Federalor State Court Because of a
Dispute Occurringin Indian Country
Although tribes are considered sovereign nations,'
the federal
government, through its plenary power, has "unilateral power . .. to legislate
specifically regarding native peoples, lands, and governments."'" But despite

amendment) (increasing the criminal penalties available to Indian tribal courts from $500 to
$5000). Also, the Court has recognized the importance of tribal courts to the maintenance of
tribal sovereignty. Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217, 221-22 (1959) (finding that, absent
congressional directive, tribal courts retain exclusive jurisdiction over disputes in Indian
Country because reservation Indians have the right "to make their own laws and be ruled by
them").
100. Sandra Day O'Connor, Lessons from the Third Sovereign: Indian Tribal Courts, 33
TULSA L.J. 1, 2 (1997).
101. 18 U.S.C. § 3598 (2006).
102. Jon M. Sands, American Indian Culture and FederalCrimes, in CULTURAL ISSUEs IN
CRIMINALDEFENSE, supra note 14, at 911 ("The reasons for such a reluctance among the Indian
tribes to opt in for the death penalty and the 'three strikes' legislation deals with issues
concerning tribal sovereignty, implementation, culture, and world view. The issues troubling
to the tribes [include that] ... [c]apital punishment is considered contrary to most Indian tribal
cultures and religions.").
103. See generally Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832).
104. Judith V. Royster & Rory SnowArrow Fausett, Control of the Reservation
Environment: TribalPrimacy,FederalDelegation,andtheLimits ofState Intrusion,64WASH.
L. REV. 581, 587 (1989); see also id. at 588-90 ("Plenary power involves more, however, than
the ability to impose a federal overlay of regulations onto tribal life. In stark fact, it means that
congressional whim ultimately can control fully the tribal exercise of sovereign powers. Under
the ruse of plenary power, Congress can strip tribes of specific governmental powers, force state
jurisdiction onto unconsenting and unwilling native governments, unilaterally abrogate native
treaties, or choose even to end the existence of tribes as federally recognized entities.
Congressional exercise of its plenary power frequently is said to be subject to the restraints of
the Constitution and the federal-Indian trust doctrine, through the mechanism ofjudicial review.
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that Congress enjoys plenary power over Indian affairs, the federal courts in
many instances share concurrent jurisdiction with tribal courts. 05 This
concurrent jurisdiction has been abridged, however, by the enactment of
certain federal statutes that remove substantial jurisdictional authority from the
tribal courts, landing reservation Indians in non-tribal courts.
The first way that a Native American ends up in non-tribal court is through
the Major Crimes Act,'06 which allows the federal government to prosecute
Native Americans who commit one or more of an enumerated list of major
crimes. 107 Prior to the Act, there was no statutory vehicle for state or federal
court jurisdiction over an Indian who commits a crime against another Indian
in Indian Country.'o The Act came as a result of the Supreme Court's
decision in Ex parte Crow Dog."o' The Crow Dog Court, in reviewing a trial
court's finding against the defendant's petition for habeascorpus relief, found
that the Indian Country Crimes Act" 0 did not give the federal government
jurisdiction over an Indian defendant who commits a crime against another
Indian in Indian Country."' Instead, the Court found that the Act - which
continues to regulate criminal activity of non-Indians in Indian Country today
- applied only to non-Indians accused of crimes in Indian Country,"l2 and that
the federal government therefore had no jurisdiction over crimes committed

These restraints, however, ultimately are ineffective defenses to counter the congressional
power of 'complete defeasance.' Moreover, these restraints do not prevent Congress from
acting, but only permit the subsequent remedy of money damages in selected instances.")
(citations omitted).
105. Nancy Thorington, Civil and CriminalJurisdiction Over Matters Arising in Indian
Country:A RoadmapforImprovingInteractionAmong Tribal,State, andFederalGovernments,
31 McGEORGE L. REv. 973, 994 (2000).
106. 18 U.S.C. § 1153.
107. Id.
108. Philip P. Frickey, CongressionalIntent,PracticalReasoning,andtheDynamicNature
ofFederalIndian Law, 78 CAL. L. REv. 1137, 1190 (1990) (noting that, at the time Exparte
Crow Dog was decided, "Indian reservations were considered federal enclaves where federal
criminal laws applied, except for a statutory exception denying federal jurisdiction over crimes
committed by one Indian against another Indian").
109. 109 U.S. 556 (1883).
110. 18 U.S.C. § 1152.
111. Crow Dog, 109 U.S. at 571.
112. Id. For academic discussion of Exparte Crow Dog and its subsequent jurisprudence,
see SIDNEY L. HARRING, CROW DOG'S CASE (1994); Sidney L. Harring, Crow Dog's Case:A
Chapterin the Legal Historyof TribalSovereignty, 14 AM. INDIAN L. REv. 191 (1989); Kevin
K. Washburn, Federal Criminal Law and Tribal Self-Determination, 84 N.C. L. REV. 779
(2006); B.J. Jones, TribalCourts:ProtectorsoftheNative ParadigmofJustice, 10 ST. THOMAS
L. REv. 87 (1997).
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by one Indian against another Indian in Indian Country, regardless of the
severity of the offense."' Congress responded to the decision by enacting the
Major Crimes Act to allow the federal courts to exercise jurisdiction over
serious crimes committed by and against tribal parties in Indian Country.'14
The second way that a Native American ends up in non-tribal court is
through Public Law 280."' Historically, states were unable to impose their
laws or values within the bounds of Indian Country through the exercise of
civil or criminal jurisdiction over Native Americans for illegal acts committed
in Indian Country." 6 Due to the actions of Congress in enacting Public Law
280, however, certain states may now exercise criminal and civil adjudicatory
jurisdiction over disputes that arise in Indian Country."'
B. Crow Dog Rationale - PrejudiceImposed Upon a Native American
Defendant Tried Under the "ReasonablePerson" Standard
Justice Matthews, in delivering the opinion of the Court in Crow Dog,
discussed the problems that would arise were the Court to allow the
prosecution of an Indian defendant under the Indian Country Crimes Act."'
First, he noted the problems that inhere in extending judicial authority "over
aliens and strangers [and] over the members of a community, separated by
race [and] tradition.""' In addition to the unfairness that may arise from a
lack of knowledge or prior warning of these impositions, Justice Matthews
stressed the unfairness of judging Native Americans by a majoritarian
standard.

113. See Crow Dog, 109 U.S. at 572.
114. William Bradford, Beyond Reparations:An American Indian Theory of Justice, 66
OHIO ST. L.J. 1, 33-34 (2005) ("The 1883 case of Ex parte Crow Dog, in which the U.S.
Supreme Court overturned the federal conviction of an Indian charged with the murder of
another Indian, induced Congress to extend the complete coercive power of federal criminal law
to the reservations. Determined to rectify the 'savage nature' of tribal law, Congress applied
'white man's morality' with the Major Crimes Act of 1885 to expressly establish concurrent
federal jurisdiction over major felonies committed by Indians on reservations regardless of the
status of their victims.").
115. 28 U.S.C. § 1360 (2006).
116. See generally Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832).
117. 28 U.S.C. § 1360. Six states have enacted Public Law 280: Alaska, California,
Minnesota, Nebraska, Oregon, and Wisconsin. Id.
118. See Crow Dog, 109 U.S. at 570-72.
119. Id. at 571.
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[This] judges them by a standard made by others, and not for them,
which takes no account of the conditions which should except
them from its exactions, and makes no allowance for their inability
to understand it. It tries them not by their peers, nor by the
customs of their people, nor the law of their land, but by superiors
of a different race, according to the law of a social state of which
they have an imperfect conception, and which is opposed to the
traditions of their history, to the habits of their lives, to the
strongest prejudices of their savage nature; one which measures the
red man's revenge by the maxims of the white man's morality.12 0
After the Court's ruling, the defendant, Crow Dog, was released to return to
his tribe, which had already found him guilty of murder and ordered him to
pay restitution to the family.12'
Congress immediately responded to the Crow Dog decision by passing the
Major Crimes Act, granting the federal government jurisdiction over Indians
who commit one of a list of enumerated crimes, even within Indian Country.'
The impetus for allowing the federal government to regulate serious crimes in
Indian Country is that tribes were not providing "strong enough" punishment
for those who committed offenses.123
Regardless of whether the tribes welcome a federal or state court's
prosecution or adjudication of their members' actions, Justice Matthews'
words nonetheless still ring true - Native Americans face a substantial
prejudice when haled into "foreign" court to be tried by "foreign" arbiters.
The decision-makers are part of the dominant Western culture and have
preconceived notions of what is lawfully reasonable. This cultural disconnect
makes a Native American defendant who takes certain actions in Indian
Country - actions that may be legally and culturally accepted within the
bounds of the separate society - subject to the judgment of people unfamiliar
with potential important cultural distinctions. Without any notification, a trier
of fact is forced to determine the defendant's culpability by comparing his or
her actions against the dominant culture's interpretation of reasonableness,
which could result in an unfair trial for a Native American defendant.

120. Id.
121. See GETCHES ET AL., supra note 93, at 157.
122. Id. at 157-58 (quoting Harring, supra note 112, at 223).
123. See HARRING,supra note 112, at 101.
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For example, in State v. Williams, 12 4 the defendants were married, both
Native Americans, and parents to a fourteen-month-old son who became ill
with what they thought was a toothache.125 They gave the baby aspirin,
hoping that it would help.126 The condition worsened to the point where the
baby could not eat, and died within two weeks after developing pneumonia.127
"They did not take the baby to a doctor because of fear that the Welfare
Department would take the baby away from them." 28
The trial court assessed the parents' behavior based on the reasonable
person standard. 129 The court found that the parents should reasonably have
known that the child was in need of a physician's care, and because a parent
has a statutory and common law duty to provide medical care to his or her
child,'30 the parents breached their duty by not taking the child to the
hospital.'"' Although parents are afforded a "reasonable" amount of discretion
in caring for their children, they must meet the same standard of care as would
"an ordinarily prudent person, solicitous for the welfare of his child and
anxious to promote its recovery."l32 The court asserted that the parents
therefore reasonably should have known that medical care was necessary, and
should have taken the necessary steps to make sure medical care was provided
to the child.'33
Although the court relied on an objective "reasonable person" standard,
ignoring the individual characteristics of the Native American defendants,'3 4
this comment argues that the court created an injustice to the parents, in that
no considerations were given to the parents' fear that their child would be
taken away from them - a fear supported by Washington's disproportionately
high rate of social workers finding cause to take Indian children away from
their parents when compared to non-Indian children.'" Therefore, the parents
in this case fairly may have thought they were acting reasonably in neglecting

484 P.2d 1167 (Wash. Ct. App. 1971).
Id. at 1169-70.
Id. at 1170.
Id. at 1173.
Id. at 1170.
Id. at 1174.
Id. at 1172-74.
Id. at 1174.
Id. at 1173 (quoting People v. Pierson, 68 N.E. 243, 244 (N.Y. 1903)).
Id. at 1174.
See id.
135. KAPLAN ET AL., supra note 80, at 393.

124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
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to take their child to the doctor in light of the high probability that a social
worker assessing their parenting skills might take their beloved son away from
them - a less common or legitimate fear for a person in the dominant
society. 13 6 Had these parents been tried in tribal court, with jury members that
could assess their actions compared to the "reasonable person" standard
established within the bounds of their community, the outcome may have been
different. The possibility exists that their fears could have been deemed
"legitimate" in response to the external influence of social workers on those
in their society. Likewise, had the state court jury been informed of these
legitimate concerns within the bounds of tribal society, perhaps the very jury
that convicted them may have reached a different outcome.
In certain circumstances, safeguards need to be implemented so that Native
Americans committing illegal acts in Indian Country are awarded as fair a trial
when haled into a federal or state court as any non-Indian defendant receives.
A non-Indian defendant is afforded the luxury of a decision-maker that
continually abides by familiar laws and cultural norms, balancing his actions
against what is reasonable in his society. A Native American defendant is not
currently afforded a similar luxury when haled into a non-tribal court. As
guardian to the Indians, the federal government must ensure that the judicial
process accounts for any important cultural distinctions that may impact a
decision-maker's perception of a Native American defendant's culpability.
C. The CurrentSentencing Guidelines Leave Little Room for Cultural
Influences to Apply in the Sentencing Process
Although Native American tribes are encouraged and do have their own
criminal courts, the tribes do not necessarily always apply the same general
principles of criminal punishment as federal and state courts, such as
deterrence and retribution."' Rather, a common pattern to emerge among
tribal justice systems is to place "emphasis on restitution rather than
retribution and on keeping harmonious relations among the members of the
community."',3 For example, before Crow Dog was haled into federal court
on a murder charge, his tribe, the Brule Sioux Nation, punished him by the
law of the tribe, ordering him to pay restitution to the victim's family."' The

136. Id.
137. See O'Connor,supra note 100, at 3.
138. Id.
139. See HARRING, supra note 112, at 104 ("The process that occurred in the homicide case
of Crow Dog, that of a tribal council meeting to arrange for a peaceful reconciliation of the
parties with an ordered gift of horses, blankets, money, or other property, was one of a number
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Brule Sioux's response to the murder was to mend the tribal society as a
whole, based upon rehabilitative principles. "The goal was the termination of
the conflict and the reintegration of all persons involved into the tribal body"
because, in the Brule Sioux life-way of hunting "and the perpetual migration
that it entailed, to succeed, all people had to work together and to conform to
one system of rules."' 40
The Major Crimes Act and its legislative history indicate a congressional
belief at the time that "Indian tribal-, family-, or clan-level retribution was
unacceptably barbarous." 41 Nonetheless, Congress sought to protect Native
Americans from being "arrested for petty offenses, taken very far away from
[their] reservation[s], and subjected to great hardships." 42 A proposed
amendment to include misdemeanor jurisdiction in the Major Crimes Act as
a means to subject Native Americans to federal jurisdiction was stricken,
leaving only the list of enumerated crimes.143 This was due in part to the
"hardship that would be occasioned for petty offenses that were not thought
of as offenses within Indian tribes.""
As time passed and federal policy shifted toward assimilation, some states
were afforded the opportunity to impose their criminal codes and punishment
theories on Native Americans in Indian Country through the enactment of
Public Law 280.145 In these states, a Native American can be prosecuted for
committing acts prohibited,as opposed to regulated,by state law, regardless
of whether the activity is considered "criminal" or even culturally accepted by
the tribe.146 And in federal court, as the law stands, Native American cultural

ofconflict resolution mechanisms available to the Sioux."). Tribes and other courts may punish
for the same offense without violating double jeopardy. United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S.
313, 329-30 (1978) ("[S]ince tribal and federal prosecutions are brought by separate sovereigns,
they are not 'for the same offense,' and the Double Jeopardy Clause thus does not bar one when
the other has occurred.").
140. HARRING, supra note 112, at 104.
141. William V. Vetter, A New Corridorfor the Maze: Tribal CriminalJurisdictionand
Nonmember Indians, 17 AM. INDIAN L. REv. 349, 406 (1992).
142. Id. at 407 (citing 15 CONG. REC. 935 (1885) (remarks of Rep. Ellis)).
143. Id. at 407-08.
144. Id. at 408. The other reasons provided for excluding misdemeanors were "the increased
opportunity for fraud against the federal government" and that "the Department of the Interior's
Court of Indian Offenses handled 'trivial violations."' Id.
145. 28 U.S.C. § 1360 (2006).
146. California v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians, 480 U.S. 202,211 (1987) (finding that
California does not have the jurisdiction under Public Law 280 to penalize a tribe for operating
bingo halls because bingo is a regulated, as opposed to a criminalized, activity).
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factors, such as acceptable behavior or appropriate punishment in tribal
society, are not invited into sentencing determinations under the Federal
Sentencing Guidelines.147
In 1987, in response to the 1984 Sentencing Reform Act,148 Congress
enacted the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, which "provide[] for the
development of guidelines that will further the basic principles of criminal
punishment: deterrence, incapacitation, just punishment, and rehabilitation."' 4 9
The Act's primary objectives are to achieve "honesty .

.

. [and] reasonable

uniformity in sentencing by narrowing the wide disparity in sentences
imposed for similar criminal offenses committed by similar offenders," as well
as "proportionality in sentencing through a system that imposes appropriately
different sentences for criminal conduct of differing severity."5 o
The Federal Sentencing Guidelines were to be applied strictly by judges in
every case, differing markedly from previous guidelines, which gave judges
wide discretion in sentencing.'s' In 2005, the Supreme Court restored some
discretion to judges in its United States v. Booker's2 holding that mandatory
application of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines is unconstitutional."' The
Federal Sentencing Guidelines therefore are merely advisory, but it is
nonetheless necessary for judges to formulate a sentence according to the
Guidelines and to give an explanation that may be reviewed by an appellate
court to justify upward or downward departures.15 4
Currently, section 5H1.10 of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines provides
that "Race, Sex, National Origin, Creed, Religion, and Socio-Economic Status

147. See generally 18 U.S.C. § 3553 (2006).
148. Id. § 3551.
149. FEDERAL SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL, supra note 91, at 1.
150. Id. at 2.
151. Id. at 3.
152. 543 U.S. 220 (2005).
153. See id at 233-36.
154. Id. at 264-65. For academic discussion of UnitedStates v. Booker and its subsequent
jurisprudence, see Paul J. Hofer, Immediate andLong-Term Effects ofUnited States v. Booker:
More Discretion,MoreDisparity,orBetterReasonedSentences?,38 ARIZ. ST. L.J.425 (2006);
Steven L. Chanenson, Booker on Crack: Sentencing'sLatest Gordian Knot, 15 CORNELL J.L.
& PUB. POL'y 551 (2006); Michael W. McConnell, The Booker Mess, 83 DENv. U. L. REv. 665
(2006); Douglas A. Berman, Tweaking Booker: Advisory Guidelines in the FederalSystem, 43
Hous. L. REV. 341 (2006); Ian Weinstein, The Revenge ofMullaney v. Wilbur: United States
v. Booker andthe ReassertionofJudicialLimits on Legislative Powerto Define Crimes, 84 OR.
L. REv. 393 (2005); M.K.B. Darmer, The Federal Sentencing Guidelines After Blakely and
Booker: The Limits of CongressionalToleranceanda GreaterRole forJuries,56 S.C. L. REV.
533 (2005).
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. . . are not relevant in the determination of the sentence.""' Before Booker,

courts deemed the consideration of cultural factors beyond the pale because
of the mandatory application of section 5H1.10, rendering the consideration
of any cultural factors in the sentencing process an abuse of discretion. 1 6 In
United States v. Guzman, a pre-Booker case, an illegal alien from Mexico
"pleaded guilty to participating in a conspiracy to distribute
methamphetamine," and the district judge departed downward from the
Guidelines after considering cultural factors influencing her behavior.' The
judge found that "Mexican cultural norms" influenced her behavior because
her boyfriend was also involved and "she was pregnant with his child."' On
appeal, the government argued that "cultural heritage can never be a basis for
a downward departure"' 59 because the Guidelines dictate that race and national
origin, among other factors, "are not relevant in the determination of a
sentence."160
The court of appeals agreed with the government and found that the district
court abused its discretion in its downward departure because the Guidelines
specifically state that national origin has no bearing on a defendant's sentence,
and evidence produced in this case was disguised to use as proof of national
origin.161 The court reasoned that a danger exists in "recognizing cultural
heritage as an independent ground for departure" because it "perpetuat[es]
stereotypes and. .. strip[s] whole classes of potential crime victim[s] of the
full protection of the law." 62 For example, such danger could manifest itself
where a request is made for a downward departure after a defendant murders
a homosexual because "the defendant had been culturally sensitized to believe
that a sexual overture from another man was a lethal challenge to his
masculinity." 63 Moreover, a defendant may argue that the patriarchal values

155. FEDERAL SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL, supra note 91, at 454.

156. See generally United States v. Guzman, 236 F.3d 830 (7th Cir. 2001).
157. Id. at 831.
158. Id. at 831-32 ("The presentence report recommended a downward departure for her .
because Mexican cultural norms dictated submission to her boyfriend's will. Moreover, she
had taken up with him in defiance of her family's wishes and it would have been humiliating
for her to break up with him and return to her family - especially since she was pregnant with
his child yet they were not married.").
159. Id. at 832.
160. Id. (quoting FEDERAL SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL, supra note 91, at 454).
161. Id.at 833.
162. Id.
163. Id.
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of his culture motivated him to "beat[] his wife for talking back to him" and
therefore justifies a downward departure.'"
The dissenting judge, however, found that cultural heritage and national
origin are not "coterminous,"165 and that evidence of cultural heritage will
justify a departure when its influence is "strong enough to place the
defendant's situation outside the heartland of cases in which a defendant's
personal characteristics might be expected to influence behavior."' 66 The
judge directed that although these district courts must "thoroughly justify" a
departure based on cultural heritage,167 it nonetheless can be relevant.
Although after Booker, the Guidelines are advisory and there is therefore
no per se abuse of discretion when a judge, in imposing a criminal sentence,
deviates from the Guidelines,' 5 "some courts still resist downward variances
based on cultural heritage."l 69 In fact, "at least three Circuit Courts have
concluded that considering a defendant's culture runs afoul of the
Guidelines."o70 The Eighth Circuit, however, has carved out its own
downward departure exception for Native Americans."' In United States v.
Big Crow, it noted that the prohibition on considering race and national origin
in the Federal Sentencing Guidelines does not include "blindness," 72 and
departed from the Guidelines to impose a lighter sentence on a Native
American criminal defendant who had shown a consistent effort to overcome
an adverse environment.173 The court found convincing the letters from the
elders of his tribe that he "has a positive reputation in his community and is
well-liked by his employers and area law enforcement personnel."' 74

164.
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.

Id.
Id. at 836 (Ripple, C.J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
Id. at 838-39.
Id. at 839.
See e.g., Gall v. United States, 522 U.S. 38, 58-60 (2007).
Marcia G. Shein, Cultural Issues in Sentencing, in CULTURAL ISSUES IN CRIMINAL
DEFENSE, supra note 14, at 944.
170. Id. at 944-45.
171. See United States v. Big Crow, 898 F.2d 1326, 1331 (8th Cir. 1990) (finding it
"appropriate" that the district court's reason to depart from the sentencing guidelines included
the defendant's "excellent employment record and his consistent efforts to overcome the
adverse environment of the Pine Ridge reservation").
172. Id. at 1332 n.3 ("[T]he requirement of neutrality ... is not a requirement of blindness.")
(alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted).
173. Id. at 1332.
174. Id. The Eighth Circuit proved that its Big Crow holding was no "anomaly" when it
affirmed downward departures for a defendant's ability to overcome adverse circumstances.
United States v. One Star, 9 F.3d 60, 61 (8th Cir. 1993) ("One Star has strong family ties and
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Although the Eighth Circuit has taken steps to account for the disparities
that Native Americans face in federal court, such action "is limited to Indian
defendants whose situations are factually distinct."' The result is that the use
of the Big Crow line of cases as precedent or persuasive authority is unlikely
to take hold. Moreover, a clear exception for Native Americans runs afoul of
the plain language of the (albeit advisory) Federal Sentencing Guidelines,
making the use of a cultural defense a somewhat difficult legal position to
defend.1'

"Cases involving Native Americans present immediate problems for federal
courts.""' This is because
[b]oth the Indian tribes and the [federal] government intended the
reservation system to be separatist, [and] [i]n many respects the
relationship between tribal and the American legal systems reflect
the notion of separatism. For example, despite the clear intention
of the [] Major Crimes Act to bring all major crimes into federal
court, there is still a strong interest in allowing tribes to control
their own dispute resolution mechanisms.'
Prior to the adoption of the discretion-limiting Guidelines, "federal judges
tried to take into account Indians' different culture and the distinct societal
background presented by the tribes" when imposing sentences upon Native
American defendants.' 79 Effectively, the sentencing judge "bridge[s] the gap
between two distinct and different cultures."'so

responsibilities and a good employment record. The court found it appropriate to consider these
factors in light of the unusual mitigating circumstances of life on an Indian reservation.");
United States v. Decora, 177 F.3d 676, 679-80 (8th Cir. 1999) ("[lIt is the combination of the
difficulty of life on the reservation and the extraordinary and unusual nature of Decora's
educational record and community leadership that allows for the departure.").
175. Timothy J.Droske, CorrectingNativeAmericanSentencing DisparityPost-Booker,91
MARQ. L. REV. 723, 755 (2008).
176. Id. at 756 ("Big Crow and its progeny . .. are a clear affront to the Guidelines' mandate
that race, sex, national origin, creed, religion, and socio-economic status are not relevant in the
determination of a sentence.") (internal quotation marks omitted).
177. Palcido G. Gomez, The Dilemma of Difference: Race as a Sentencing Factor, 24
GOLDEN GATE U. L. REv. 357, 376 (1994).
178. Id. at 377.
179. Jon M. Sands, DepartureReform and Indian Crimes: Reading the Commission's Staff
Paper with Reservations, 9 FED. SENT'G REP. 144, 144 (1996) [hereinafter Sands, Indian
Crimes].
180. Gomez, supra note 177, at 376 (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks
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Evidence shows that federal judges, prosecutors, and public defenders
"have developed a unique sensitivity to the [tribal] sense of justice."'8 For
instance, tribal cultures often find appropriate criminal punishment to include
mediated settlements that result in the defendant receiving counseling or
offering restitution to family members, often by "giving livestock and tending
to the injured family."' 82 A public defender testified before the Committee on
explaining that the Navajo sometimes find mediated
the Judiciary,'
settlements a more appropriate form of punishment than imprisonment.' In
fact, she tried a case where her client "was charged with killing his uncle," and
the victim's family requested that the defendant not be punished with
imprisonment.'
These "considerations seem especially critical given that the tribes are
separate political sovereigns, whose jurisdiction is that of domestic nations."'
In fact, one scholar commented on the irony that, although "[t]he concept of
separatism is well founded,... the American legal system readily takes tribal
disputes from the reservation and places them on the desks of federal
judges."' Recognition of "radically different world views" are represented
in treaty negotiations, as "whites and Indians still maintain realities that are
But despite that "[t]he differences in world views are
worlds apart."'
reflected in the divergent legal systems," the recognition of these separatist
legal systems often emerge more in theory than in practice.'
The Sentencing Commission, at the time the Federal Sentencing Guidelines
were formulated, was "aware of the role Indian culture played in Indian
offenses."' 90 The Commission heard testimony "about the culturally different
and unique context presented by Indian crimes in Indian Country," 9 ' and was

omitted).
181. Id. at 378.
182. Sands, Indian Crimes, supra note 179, at 146.
183. Gomez, supra note 177, at 378 n.108.
184. Id.
185. Id. ("[T]he tribe will, sometimes through the tribal courts, or sometimes not, have
arranged sort of a mediated settlement between families, and the victim's family says, 'We
don't want this guy to go to prison'. . . . I had a case last fall where my client was charged with
killing his uncle, and the family all got together and said, 'You know, we lost one person. It
was partly his fault, and we don't want this kid to go to jail."') (alteration in original).
186. Sands, Indian Crimes, supra note 179, at 144.
187. Gomez, supra note 177, at 377-78.
188. Id. at 377.
189. Id. at 377-78.
190. Sands, Indian Crimes, supra note 179, at 145.
191. Id
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urged to consider "the special circumstances that surround sentencing an
Indian offender and a sensitivity to the tribe's sense of justice." 9 2 This
testimony consequently "struck a chord" with Supreme Court Justice Breyer,
who was the Commissioner at the time.' "His solution was to urge courts to
exercise their discretion to depart in the Indian cases," recognizing the
importance that culture plays when sentencing these defendants. 94 He did not,
however, think it necessary to write a specific guideline for unusual
community practices. Instead, he suggested authorizing a policy whereby
judges may depart from the Guidelines at their discretion.9'
When the Federal Sentencing Guidelines were adopted, cultural factors
were "subsumed" within the 5H prohibitions on the consideration of race and
national origin.' This reality, coupled with the fact that "federal sentences
are often harsher than their state counterparts," results in Indian defendants
tried in federal court for crimes committed in Indian Country receiving
"disproportionately harsher sentences than if they were non-Indian or had
committed their crimes off the reservation."' 97 This sentencing disparity is a
consequence not only of the unique jurisdictional arrangements, but also of
"socioeconomic conditions, as well as many tribes' geographic isolation,
Indian culture, and underlying racial tensions with the surrounding
population."l 98 Despite the disparity, however, relevant cultural factors will
rarely be considered in light of the current structure of the Federal Sentencing
Guidelines.
IV Advocating a CulturalDefense for Native Americans

Because of the federal government's protective obligations as guardian of
the tribes,' 99 as well as the federal policy toward self-determination, there
should be a formal Native American cultural defense for tribal members tried
in non-tribal courts. This will assuage the fears of lower courts that their
decisions will be overturned as an abuse of discretion for considering such

192.
193.
194.
195.
196.
197.
198.
199.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
See Droske, supra note 175, at 724 (citation omitted).
Id. at 740.
Guzman, supra note 92, at 651.
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evidence in sentencing.200 The proposed rule should provide strict and explicit
criteria to guide a trier of fact in controlling the entrance and presentation of
cultural evidence.
A. The FederalRules of Evidence Should Create a PresumptionFavoring
the Admission of CulturalEvidence in Native American Cases
Although courts occasionally allow the admission of Native American
cultural evidence, the current evidentiary structure makes it likely that such
evidence, even when related to a fundamental issue in the case, will be
deemed "irrelevant" and excluded in criminal and civil cases.20 In many
instances, however, the evidence is extremely probative and furthers efforts
to ensure that the justifications for criminal punishment, such as deterrence
and retribution, are served.202
Judges that find this type of culture evidence "irrelevant" do so for different
reasons. First, some judges promote a single, national standard by which to
try defendants to engender uniformity in the law.203 Otherjudges simply may
not understand the cultural differences because they likely come from the
dominant society and are unfamiliar with the practices of indigenous and
minority cultures.20
Because federal statutes require federal and some state judges to hear cases
with Indian parties, 20 5 it is important that these judges do not allow their
cultural unfamiliarity to disrupt an Indian defendant's right to a fair trial. To
promote uniformity in admitting this type of evidence in federal courts, the
rules should therefore be amended to promote the admission of relevant
cultural evidence into trials involving Native American parties.
A protective measure to allow the admission of otherwise inadmissible
evidence is not unusual. For instance, the Federal Rules of Evidence protect
the admission of prior sexual misconduct in sexual assault and molestation
cases due to the unique and sensitive circumstances in those crimes.206
Likewise, Native American defendants need protection because they are

200. RENTELN,supra note 13, at 206.
201. Id. at 5-6.
202. See id. at 187-88; id. at 6 ("In general, justice requires looking at the context of
individuals' actions.").
203. Id. at 192-93 ("One major practical concern is the fear that the absence of a uniform
legal code will lead to anarchy.... These commentators contend that equality means identical
treatment under the law.").
204. See id. at 185-87.
205. 18 U.S.C. § 1153 (2006); 28 U.S.C. § 1360 (2006).
206. See FED. R. EviD. 412.
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members of a considerably vulnerable minority, continually brought into
courts that do not represent the values and traditions of their societies, and
because they too have unique and sensitive circumstances not currently
appreciated by the courts. To create a balance of fairness, a safeguarding
presumption favoring admission of culturally relevant evidence should be in
place to ensure that their rights are protected.
1. CulturalEvidence Is Relevant
Evidence is considered relevant when it has "any tendency" to prove or
disprove an issue in the case that is "of consequence."207 Accordingly, there
is a very low threshold to satisfy a finding of relevance.208 Cultural factors
commonly influence behavior, and are thus often relevant in a criminal or civil
case. 209 For example, in a civil case, cultural evidence can be relevant to the
determination of damages, and may justify a greater award when cultural
factors are implicated.2 10 In the criminal context, courts may find an abuse of
discretion by the trial court for rejecting the admission of cultural evidence
when, for example, it relates to the mental element that the prosecution had to
prove for conviction, as in the Wu case. 2 1' The Wu court reasoned that Asian
immigrants who live within the bounds of an Asian community may not have

207. FED. R. EVID. 401.
208. David Crump, On the Uses of IrrelevantEvidence, 34 Hous. L. REV. 1, 15 n.58 (1997);
Peter Nicolas, "They Say He's Gay": The Admissibility oJ Evidence of Sexual Orientation,37
GA. L. REV. 793, 797 (2003) (noting that Rule 401's threshold for admissibility "sets an
extremely low standard").
209. See Renteln, supra note 14, at 771.
210. See RENTELN, supra note 13, at 202 ("In some of the other cases the plaintiffs seek
monetary damages. This was the object of relatives who sued when medical examiners
performed unauthorized autopsies, of the young Roma girls when police conducted a search
with an invalid warrant, and of the teenage Orthodox Jewish girl who jumped off the ski lift.
The argument is predicated on the notion that because of their background, the particular
incident was more traumatic than for the person of the dominant culture. Hence, the plaintiff
is entitled to a larger damage award than the ordinary plaintiff would receive."); id. at 205
("[T]he ethnic minority plaintiff argues that given the greater magnitude of the injury, the
damage award should likewise be correspondingly greater. The trauma caused by the 'cultural
offense' warrants more restitution. This argument was advanced in the case of the Orthodox
girl who leapt off the ski lift, the Hindu man who mistakenly was served a beef burrito, and the
families whose deceased relatives were improperly prepared for funeral rites.").
211. People v. Wu, 286 Cal. Rptr. 868, 882 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991).
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the opportunity to acculturate into mainstream society and conform their
actions to what is "reasonable." 2 12
Native Americans who grow up on tribal reservations are extremely
analogous to the defendant in Wu, who was sheltered from the dominant
society by her immersion in her own culture, just as reservation boundaries
may shelter Indian defendants from outside cultural influence. Yet, policy
favoring the accommodation of their cultural beliefs and norms is even more
compelling than for recent immigrants because recent immigrant defendants
made the choice to avail themselves to the laws and customs of the dominant
culture, while Native Americans do not purposefully avail themselves to those
laws and customs when they remain within the bounds of the reservation. In
other words, they do not choose to be part of dominant culture, but rather
adhere to tribal law and exist under the auspices of a separate sovereign.
Cultural evidence therefore will often be relevant to a Native American's case
in criminal and civil court, and should be recognized as such under federal law
so that those who do not choose to assimilate into mainstream society receive
adequate safeguards when judged by anyone but their own.
2. The Probative Value of CulturalEvidence Outweighs Potential
Prejudice
"Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is
substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the
issues, or misleading the jury, or by consideration of undue delay, waste of
time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence."2 13 The probative value
of cultural evidence outweighs potential prejudice because the evidence
demonstrates an influence on the defendant's state of mind, and thus perhaps
motive, due to the principle of "enculturation." Enculturation is the notion
that one "learns from the society in which he or she is born" by
subconsciously adopting the values of the group, which in turn "affects both
cognition and behavior."2 14 Individuals can nonetheless act independently
from cultural conditioning and can acquire their own "moral judgments," but
enculturation does "predispose[] individuals to act in certain ways."215
These predispositions are always subject to modification by either
"acculturation" or "assimilation." 216 Acculturation occurs when "two

212.
213.
214.
215.
216.

See id. at 885-87.
FED.R.EviD.403.
RENTELN, supra note 13, at 12.
Id. at 13.
Id.
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autonomous cultural groups" come in contact with one another.217
Assimilation, on the other hand, is "the process by which individuals adopt the
value system of the new culture." 218 Most Native Americans growing up
within the bounds of the reservation experience enculturation, but, at the same
time, may experience acculturation to mainstream Western values. For
instance, watching television219 or interacting with non-Indians while traveling
off-reservation likely expose the Native American to types of behavior more
familiar to the dominant society.
Despite that acculturation may enable the Native American to "pass in the
mainstream," it will rarely amount to complete assimilation.220 People "retain
strong commitments to their traditions," so it is "unrealistic to expect" that
those types of interactions would allow a Native American to conform his
behavior to meet the dominant society's standard of reasonableness in all
respects. 22 1 For example, the Major Crimes Act is a means to assimilate
Native Americans by imposing upon them ideals of the dominant culture with
respect to which crimes ought to be punished severely. This assimilation in
punishment, however, has not necessarily transformed tribal criminal justice
theory over time.222
Many cases discussing the cultural defense involve immigrants who act in
a way deemed criminal by Western standards, but that would either receive a
mitigated sentence or would not be considered criminal at all in their home
countries.223 The basic idea is that a person is inherently shaped by his culture,
and residing in another culture does not automatically assimilate that person's
worldview or behavior. 224 Native Americans that grow up in Indian Country
are similar to those defendants who recently immigrated to the United States
and still lived within the bounds of a community that followed all the customs
of their home countries. Tribal members who live on the reservation, are
active in the community, obey tribal laws, and adhere to tribal custom do not
have the opportunity - or perhaps even the desire - to participate in the
dominant culture. Despite that mainstream culture may seep into tribal life to
217. Id.
218. Id.
219. Id.
220. Id.
221. Id.
222. See e.g., Gomez, supra note 177, at 378 n.108. The Navajo, for example, modernly
have adhered to retributive principles in criminal sentencing. Id.
223. See e.g., RENTELN, supra note 13, at 25.
224. See id. at 12-13.
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subliminally condition tribal members in some ways to act and think as nonIndians do, tribal culture still dominates.22 5 Moreover, it seems contradictory
that federal policy ostensibly promotes self-determination and the preservation
of traditional tribal law and custom, but does not protect these cultural
differences in the justice system.
Tribal members living on the reservation may not be sufficiently
assimilated to appreciate the "reasonable person" of the dominant society, but
instead adhere to their own standards of reasonableness within the bounds of
their legal and cultural societies. In fact, that is precisely what selfdetermination is - recognizing, appreciating, and promoting the unique nature
of tribal law and custom, which includes a similarly unique standard of
reasonableness to be judged in light of those laws and customs. The result is
that cultural evidence will often be extremely probative to determinations of
"reasonableness" when Indian defendants are tried in "foreign" courts.
3. Denying the Admission of CulturalEvidence Creates an Unfair
Prejudiceto the Native American Defendant
Currently, under the Federal Rules of Evidence, if a piece of evidence is
relevant, it is admissible so long as the risk of unfair prejudice does not
substantially outweigh its probative value.226 By precluding the admission of
"propensity" evidence through the Rules, 227 Congress was adopting a
"common-law tradition ... [that] disallow[s] resort by the prosecution to any
kind of evidence of a defendant's character to establish a probability of his
guilt," based on the "overriding policy" of preventing "confusion of issues,
unfair surprise and undue prejudice." 22 8 Like the admission of propensity
evidence, the inadmission of relevant cultural evidence can unfairly prejudice
a Native American defendant because, without the admission of such evidence,
he is being judged by those unable to inherently appreciate the nuances of
possible cultural motivations. While the rule precluding "propensity" evidence
prevents unduly prejudicial information from entering the courts, the
preclusion of cultural evidence effectively engenders prejudice.
The Court in Crow Dog cautioned of the prejudice that arises when a
defendant is judged by those who are not his peers or by "the customs of

225. See Patrice H. Kunesh, ConstantGovernments: TribalResilience andRegenerationin
Changing Times, 19 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 8, 8 (2009).
226. FED. R. EvID. 403.
227. FED. R. EviD. 404(b).
228. Michelson v. United States, 335 U.S. 469, 475-76 (1948).
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[another] people."229 The standard by which the Native American is judged
"makes no allowance for [his] inability to understand it."230 The Major Crimes
Act, passed in response to the Crow Dog decision, does not account for this
potential prejudice. Congress has not since drafted any legislation to create a
safeguard for Native American defendants who are potentially prejudiced when
they are judged by a "foreign" standard of "reasonableness."
Amending the Federal Rules of Evidence to create a presumption of
relevance favoring the admission of cultural evidence would reduce the
prejudice that a Native American defendant experiences when tried by a
"foreign" court, unfamiliar with the culture motivating his behavior. When a
non-Indian is tried in a non-tribal court, the standard is already tailored to what
is "reasonable" in light of the laws and customs of the dominant culture. A
presumption favoring the admission of Native American cultural evidence
would, in effect, level the playing field of "objectivity" by determining the
"reasonableness" of a tribal defendant's actions in light of the laws and
customs of his tribal culture.
Although it can be argued that the admission of Native American cultural
evidence could prejudice a case by wasting time or confusing the jury, such
concerns are outweighed by the potential prejudice that could result from
determinations of "reasonableness" that are not in accord with the defendant's
societal norms. Without any education in Native American culture, the trier
of fact could find the defendant culpable for reasons other than the merits of
the case, perhaps through reinforcement of negative stereotypes of Native
Americans as "savage," or based on a perceived need to assimilate the
defendant into the dominant culture. If the trier of fact is educated on the link
between the defendant's cultural and legal heritage, the negative stereotypes
could be replaced with understanding, and the trier of fact could decide on the
merits of the case.
4. Proposing a ProtectiveAmendment
To ensure that cultural evidence relevant to the Native American
defendant's acts is admitted, one option is for the Indian defendant to present
evidence prior to trial, based on a preponderance standard, establishing (1) that
he is a Native American, (2) "that the belief is a legitimate part of community
practice," and (3) "that the defendant actually believed and was motivated by

229. Exparte Crow Dog, 109 U.S. 556, 571 (1883).
230. Id.
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the tradition.""3 ' If that standard is met, the trier of fact can then determine the
weight to be placed on such evidence in relation to the facts and merits of the

case. 232
To prove that the belief actually exists, the Indian defendant can present
expert witnesses or tribal leaders to educate on the cultural implications of the
case. 23 3 Concerns arise that expert witnesses may be "hired guns for lawyers
on either side," and that tribal leaders may "succumb to pressures to
misrepresent their culture in order to save a relative or friend."234 The problem,
however, is not always that the cultural evidence will be discounted as partisan,
but rather that it is not presented at all - "the main problem . . . [is] the

proclivity of judges to exclude cultural information as irrelevant." 235
The adversarial process is designed to bring concerns about biased experts
in front of triers of fact for them to assess the weight to be placed on that
evidence.236 "[T]o guarantee the caliber of expert witnesses," lists of reputable
experts on different tribes and customs can be compiled.237 After the
credibility of the expert has been established, the trier of fact can review the
evidence to determine if and how the cultural beliefs influenced the
defendant's behavior, as well as the resultant extent of damages.
B. The Standardof "Reasonableness"forNative American Defendants
Should Be a "ReasonableNative American Person"
There is no concrete definition of "culture" because it is a fluid concept that
arises from the interaction of those who share the same "language, history, and
values."" Likewise, the concept of "reasonableness" has no purely objective
identity because its definition includes one person's assessment of another's
actions. The "reasonable person" standard used to evaluate criminal and civil
liability is assessed in light of a person of the ordinary "race, class, sexual
Although the reasonable person theory
orientation, and gender." 239
contemplates that the decision-maker will evaluate the defendant's actions
against this objective standard, the reality is that decision-makers will

231.
232.
233.
234.

Kanter, supra note 8, at 430; RENTELN, supra note 13, at 207.
See Ewing v. Burnet, 36 U.S. 41, 50-51 (1837).
See Kanter, supra note 8, at 431.
RENTELN, supra note 13, at 206 (internal quotation marks omitted).

235. Id.
236.
237.
238.
239.

See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 595-96 (1993).
RENTELN, supra note 13, at 206.
SONG, supra note 50, at 18.
CYNTHIA LEE, MURDER AND THE REASONABLE MAN 206 (2003).
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subjectively "put themselves in the shoes of the defendant and decide whether
they would have felt or acted the way the defendant did."240
Recognizing the special status of tribes as "sub-communities" in the United
States with their own sets of laws, courts, and enforcement processes, it is
imperative to legally recognize the established standards of care acceptable to
these communities. In fact, it sends mixed signals to do otherwise, in light of
all of the legislation directed toward self-determination. When states try
people in their courts, they are able to craft their own rules and decide their
cases with respect to standards deemed acceptable by members of that state.
So too are tribes allowed when trying cases in their own courts. Tribes are
limited, however, in the types of suits over which their courts may assert
jurisdiction.241 Because of the limited nature of tribal court jurisdiction under
current law, federal judges should be educated on tribal laws and customs to
further the principles of justice.
It is fair to say that the more similarities the defendant shares with the trier
of fact, the more the trier of fact "is likely to see the defendant's beliefs and
Because a purely subjective standard of
actions as reasonable."24 2
reasonableness would, in effect, "collapse" this American standard and
tradition,243 it is crucial to maintain a level of objectivity. That does not mean,
however, that Native Americans should become victims of misguided
judgments based on the standards of another society, whose conception of
"reasonableness" depends on "foreign" beliefs and customs.
The judicial system's concept of "reasonableness" derives from the
dominant culture, which reflects mainstream American politics, religion, and
accepted behaviors. 2" For example, defendants may perhaps successfully
mitigate a charge from murder to manslaughter if they "are provoked into a

240. Id
241. For scholarly discussion on the limits of tribal jurisdiction, see Frank R. Pommersheim,
The Crucible of Sovereignty: Analyzing Issues of TribalJurisdiction, 31 ARIZ. L. REV. 329
(1989); Laurie Reynolds, Adjudication in Indian Country: The Confusing ParametersofState,
Federal, and Tribal Jurisdiction, 38 WM. & MARY L. REV. 539 (1997); Laurie Reynolds,
"Jurisdiction" in Federal Indian Law: Confusion, Contradiction, and Supreme Court
Precedent, 27 N.M. L. REV. 359 (1997); Allison M. Dussias, Geographically-Basedand
Membership-BasedViews oflndian TribalSovereignty: The Supreme Court'sChangingVision,
55 U. PITT. L. REV. 1 (1993).
242. LEE, supra not 239, at 206.
243. Id. at 206-07.
244. See id at 109-10.
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heat of passion" by a spouse's infidelity. 245 But many states do not accept that
a person is legally provoked by "mere words," precluding the lessening of a
charge where a defendant is provoked by verbal harassment.2 46 Despite the
refusal to allow "mere words" to constitute sufficient provocation, "some
courts draw a distinction between informational words (i.e., words that convey
information that, if observed directly, would provoke the reasonable person
into a heat of passion) and insulting words."247 This increased leniency in
sentencing for "cuckolds who kill their partners"24 8 is based upon a norm that
is "so embedded in American culture that we Americans do not perceive [it]
as cultural per se,"249 despite that, in effect, the charge is mitigated through a
cultural defense. Therefore, despite that a person has participated in
wrongdoing, the dominant society has decided that a particular set of
circumstances render that defendant less deserving of extended punishment.
Medical neglect cases similarly illustrate how a purely objective approach
to "reasonableness" without consideration of cultural factors is itself
unreasonable.2"o Some of these cases arise when parents, for religious reasons,
fail to seek medical treatment for their children, who consequently suffer or
die.25' Courts generally do not recognize any religious defense to such parental
neglect, based on a deep-seated belief that there should be "little sympathy for
a free exercise defense in criminal prosecutions, especially those involving
children." 252 Yet, lawmakers, representing the interests of their constituents,
have enacted statutory exemptions to protect parents of the Christian Science
faith. 253 These parents can escape prosecution when they entertain faith-based
healing for their children, instead of conventional medical treatment, and the
child consequently suffers harm or death.254 Christian Scientists do not believe
in disease, maintaining that it is "an illusion created by God." 25 5 They believe
that if they "seek[] medical help, they will undermine the efficacy of faith

245.
246.
247.
248.
249.
250.
251.
252.
253.
254.
255.

Id. at 110.
Id. at 31-32.
Id. at 32.
SONG, supra note 50, at 97.
See LEE, supra not 239, at I10.
See generally RENTELN, supra note 13, at 61-67.
Id. at 65.
Id. at 66.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 65.

https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/ailr/vol35/iss2/6

No. 2]

COMMENTS

657

healing." 25 6 Based on the recognition of these beliefs, legislatures have altered
the standard of reasonableness to be used by their courts.
The values and beliefs embedded in the dominant culture have spoken
through state legislatures to reflect that a particular course of conduct is
reasonable when certain factors are present, such as when Christian Scientist
parents choose religion over medical care for their children. An examination
of the cultural considerations of non-Indian society reveals how Indians raised
according to tribal law and custom could be, and often are, disadvantaged
when haled into "foreign" courts. Perhaps their laws and customs have
rendered their reactions to certain circumstances "reasonable" within their
cultural bounds, despite the dominant society's disagreement with these
findings. And without enough political power to speak at a non-tribal
legislative level (as did the supporters of the Christian Science religion), these
defendants will unfailingly experience an uphill battle in "foreign" courts until
their cultural considerations are factored into punishment schemes.
To combat this unfairness, Congress legislatively should mandate that
Indian defendants tried in non-tribal courts are to be judged under a
"reasonable Native American person" standard that contemplates their unique
values and customs. This mandate should require that the trier of fact be
provided relevant information about the defendant's tribal culture to ensure
that the trier of fact is equipped to evaluate a tribal defendant's actions in light
of cultural considerations.
C. CongressShould Grant a DownwardDeparturein the Federal
Sentencing Guidelinesfor Native Americans When Cultural Considerations
Affect Their Actions
Currently, the Federal Sentencing Guidelines are not drafted to allow or
encourage departures therefrom for Native Americans based on cultural
factors, such as tribal punishment theory.25 Rather, the "advisory" Guidelines
prohibit departures based on race or national origin.258 To "reflect the
uniqueness of Indian culture and respect for Indian sovereignty," 259 and to
provide unanimity in the processes of courts sentencing Native American
defendants, the Commission should formulate a departure that respects the

256. Id.

257. See FEDERAL SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL, supra note 91, at 454.
258. Id.
259. Sands, Indian Crimes, supra note 179, at 146.
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policy of self-determination by encouraging the promotion of tribal laws and
customs.
Although "the guidelines cannot consider every factor, nor all the different
combinations of factors,"2"o the Guidelines should be amended to provide a
framework under which judges can consider cultural factors to justify a
departure in Native American criminal sentencing. Otherwise, courts are
prevented from "honestly and openly" using factors such as race and culture
(which could include an examination of tribal punishment theory or prior tribal
punishment) to "obtain fair, just and lenient sentences within the framework
of the guidelines."2 6'
The current Federal Sentencing Guidelines, coupled with the split in judicial
authority, engenders confusion with respect to whether cultural factors,
including tribal punishment theory and the confines of culturally acceptable
Moreover, the trust
behavior, may influence the sentencing process.
requires that the
federal
government
the
tribes
and
the
relationship between
govemment fulfill protective obligations to the tribes and individual Indians.262
In furtherance of these protective duties, the Federal Sentencing Guidelines
should be amended to ensure that all tribal defendants receive fair trials that
respect and consider their unique cultural circumstances.
For example, when a defendant seeks to use the cultural defense in the guilt
phase, the defendant should have to prove that he is a Native American and
that the cultural reason for departure is based upon a legitimate belief within
his tribal society. Along with showing that the reduced sentence is appropriate,
he should also be required to show that deterrence would not be reduced.26 3 In
turn, this will allow the policy interest of deterring criminal conduct to hold
some weight in the analysis. At the same time, it will allow the trier of fact to
consider cultural factors in sentencing, thereby promoting both selfdetermination and principles of fairness.
When the Native American criminal defendant is on trial for a serious crime,
such as first degree murder, and his tribe favors restitution to imprisonment,
the defendant must then demonstrate how a punishment of restitution will not
encourage him or others to commit a similar act in the future. And, if the
"foreign" court determines that restitution is inappropriate and instead imposes
imprisonment, that the tribe previously punished the defendant should factor
into determining the length of such imprisonment. For instance, in a case like

260.
261.
262.
263.

Id.
Id.
Guzman, supra note 92, at 651.
Sands, Indian Crimes, supra note 179, at 146-47.
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Crow Dog, where the defendant was ordered by the tribe to pay restitution to
the victim's family as criminal punishment, 2" the judge should grant a
downward departure from the Guidelines, so long as restitution is a legitimate
tribal punishment. In a tribal society where rehabilitation is the most important
principle of criminal punishment,265 the federal government should respect that
tribal policy even when the tribal defendant is tried in a court outside
reservation boundaries.
On the other end of the spectrum, however, are certain activities that are not
considered criminal at all by tribes, but are nonetheless prosecuted by Public
Law 280 states and the federal government. That the defendant's tribe does
not find the activity "criminal" should be a mandatory consideration in
determining an appropriate sentence - or whether to punish at all. Requiring
judges to consider Native American cultural factors in the sentencing process
will protect Native Americans from forced assimilation. Where conduct is
tradition within the community but is illegal under the law of the dominant
society, consideration of cultural factors will protect tribal members who
simply wish to participate in tribal traditions.
Although the consideration of Native American culture in the sentencing
process is important in light of federal Indian policy, the Guidelines should
reflect the unique circumstances in which the need for a departure will arise,
and should accordingly limit its use. Such a limitation will prevent criminal
defendants from abusing the departure when it is not warranted. The
amendment to the Federal Sentencing Guidelines should be reflective of these
concerns. The following is a humble attempt to craft statutory language to
insert into the Guidelines:
Consideration of Native American Cultural Factors in Sentencing
(a) Native American cultural factors that may affect a defendant's criminal
actions shall be considered and may justify a downward departure from
these guidelines, provided that the defendant proves:
(1) his or her status as a tribal member;
(2) that his or her actions were motivated by a legitimate belief within his
or her tribal society;266
(3) that the resulting sentence effectuates deterrence.

264. HARRING,supra note 112, at 104.
265. See, e.g., supra notes 182-85 and accompanying text.
266. Subsection (a) of the proposed amendment to the Guidelines resembles that proposed
by Kanter, supra note 8.
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(b) In examining cultural factors affecting a Native American defendant's
criminal actions, courts shall consider both tribal punishment theory and
prior tribal punishment.
(c) This section is unaffected by section 5H 1.10.
Similarly, Public Law 280 should be amended to impose this principle upon
state court judges. This would, in effect, put into law, as well as give notice to
triers of fact, that although the Guidelines are meant to be "uniform" to prevent
disparity in sentencing, federal policy promotes the legitimacy of tribal
governments to govern their members. This includes the right to impose their
own punishment theories upon their members, which should carry over into the
non-tribal sentencing process. Promoting the use of tribal punishment theory
or other cultural factors to influence tribal member sentencing furthers not only
the policy of self-determination, but also the federal government's trust
obligations.
V Conclusion
A formalized cultural defense for Native Americans does more than protect
the individual - it protects tribal sovereignty and self-determination. It is the
tribal society that controls the concept of "reasonableness" to which its
members adhere. The relevance and probative value of evidence should thus
be determined in light of cultural considerations. The Federal Rules of
Evidence should be amended to account for Native American cultural factors
in the admission of evidence. When a Native American enters a non-tribal
court, safeguards must be in place to protect the entrance of all evidence that
is relevant to that party's behavior or any other issue that is of consequence to
that particular case.
For those cases in which cultural evidence is admitted, the defendant should
be judged not by the "reasonable person" standard of the dominant society, but
by a "reasonable Native American person" standard, considering the evidence
and the defendant's actions in light of the values of his individual tribe. Triers
of fact must therefore add a subjective layer to an otherwise objective standard.
Last, the Federal Sentencing Guidelines and Public Law 280 must reflect the
legitimacy of tribal punishment theory. The determination of a Native
American defendant's criminal sentencing should include prior or preferred
tribal punishment, which may warrant a downward departure from the
Guidelines in some cases. Collectively, these changes to the sentencing
structure will further the policy of self-determination, increase confidence in
non-tribal courts among Native Americans, and reduce prejudice to Native
Americans tried in courts whose values may differ markedly from their own.
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